摘要
委托代理理论提出了企业家报酬的线性结构。本文通过模型分析得出企业家报酬业绩敏感性系数的影响因素,进而对企业家报酬实证研究的结果给出一个基本的解释。文章还分析了如何利用这些影响因素来设计企业家激励报酬制度,并提出需要通过相应的组织结构调整来实现这种激励报酬的设计思想。
Agency theory proposes a linear structure of executive entrepreneur compensation. The paper draws factors that influence the sensitiveness of compensation - performance in term of model analysis and proposes a basic explanation to executive remuneration. It analyses how utilize these factors to design executive incentive compensation system, and suggests that realizing the incentive remuneration design philosophy should adjust organizational framework.
出处
《首都经济贸易大学学报》
2004年第1期56-61,共6页
Journal of Capital University of Economics and Business
基金
国家自然科学基金项目资助(基金号:70302018)