罗尔斯政治自由主义对非理性者的排斥

The Exclusion of Unreasonableness in Rawls’s Political Liberalism

在《政治自由主义》中,罗尔斯以诸种“理性”的要素构筑了一套封闭的公共证成系统以期为《正义论》中遗留的稳定性问题提供解决方案。然而问题在于,这一目的的实现必须以排除非理性者为代价。并且,在对“理性”的界定中,罗尔斯又以一种过于狭隘方式将对某种特殊政治价值的信念作为判断理性与否的标准。如果罗尔斯对此没有提供充足的理由,那么于非理性者而言,公共证成将不仅是排斥的,甚至也会是武断,它的一切结果都可能意味着对他们自主性的强迫。而这又会威胁政治自由主义自身的内在一致性,因为它声称其将所有公民都视为自由而平等的,且将政治正当性(political legitimacy)原则奠立在全体公民的一致同意上。

In Political Liberalism,in order to solve the problem of stability which left over in A Theory of Justice,Rawls constructs a closed system of public justification which consists of several“reasonable”elements.However,this aim must be achieved at the cost of excluding the“unreasonableness”.Moreover,Rawls gives an overly narrow definition to“reasonable”,he takes the belief in some particular political values as a criterion.Thus,if Rawls does not provide sufficient reasons and justifications for this,the public justification will not only be exclusive,but even arbitrary for those who are considered unreasonable under this criterion,and all its consequences will be the coercion of their autonomy.This,in turn,would threaten the internal consistency of political liberalism itself,since it claims to regard all citizens as free and equal,and to base the principle of political legitimacy on the unanimous consent of all citizens.