摘要
强化食品安全违法惩罚力度,何以造成基层执法的避重就轻和力度整体弱化?基于多任务委托代理理论的个案研究发现,在执法激励不变的情况下,强化执法对象违法惩罚力度可以通过重塑执法成本,重新分配执法注意力,由此造成基层执法的避重就轻和力度整体弱化。同时,强化惩罚力度的这一效应,受到监管信息状况的调节。研究结果表明,"重典治乱"要打组合拳,在普法的基础上,短期内加大基层执法资源的投入和通过较长周期推动监管数字化建设都是备选项。本研究贡献了关于强化惩罚力度效应的新知识,并对多任务委托代理理论和威慑理论有所推进。
Why does strengthening food safety violation punishments lead to selective enforcement and an overall weakening of enforcement efforts at the grassroots level?A case study based on multitask principal-agent theory finds that,with no change in enforcement incentives,strengthening the punishment for violations can redistribute enforcement attention by reshaping enforcement costs and,as a result,cause selective enforcement and an overall weakening of enforcement efforts at the grassroots level.Meanwhile,this effect of strengthening the punishment is regulated by whether there is sufficient regulatory information to lock in the cost of law enforcement.The results show that strengthening punishment requires supporting measures to achieve the desired effect,and that increasing resources for grassroots law enforcement and promoting digitalization of regulation are all options based on legal literacy.This research contributes new knowledge about the effects of strengthening the punishment of violations and contributes to multitasking principal-agent theory and deterrence theory.
作者
赖诗攀
邱文峥
Lai Shipan;Qiu Wenzheng(School of Political Science and Public Administration and Center of Political Development and Public Governance,Huaqiao University,Quanzhou 362021;School of Public Policy and Administration,Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi’an 710049)
出处
《中国行政管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第4期14-21,共8页
Chinese Public Administration
基金
福建省社科基金一般项目“福建省基层食品安全监管机构履职状况、制度逻辑及对策研究”(编号:FJ2020B029)
华侨大学中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(编号:19SKGC-QG01)
关键词
食品安全
强化惩罚力度
执法成本
监管信息
选择性执法
food safety
strengthen the punishment
law enforcement cost
regulatory information
selective law enforcement