道德上的自我沉溺与反躬自省——对威廉斯实践审思观念的反思与超越

Moral Self-Indulgence and Self-Examination:Rethinking and Overcoming Bernard Williams’ Notion of Practical Deliberation

威廉斯认为,出于完整性而行动可以免于道德上的自我沉溺之指责。为了论证此观点,他指出这一指责成立的前提条件是审思的反身性特征。本文认为,威廉斯对此前提条件的定位并不够精确。通过辨析反身性的不同呈现方式,引起指责的根源应该定位在自我关注的虚伪性上。与威廉斯仅仅关注所谓典型的有美德行动的实践审思不同,本文试图祛除威廉斯对反身性审思的怀疑和否定,揭示并论证一种被其论述所遮蔽的反身性的实践审思。这种审思方式将儒家修身传统纳入道德心理学的视野之中,将为西方伦理学的固有理解提供启发。

Bernard Williams argues that the actions out of integrity are immune to the charge of moral selfindulgence because the premise of this charge includes certain reflexivity of deliberation.Nevertheless,Williams’s understanding of the relevant premise seems not precise enough.Through an analysis of various cases of reflexivity,this article argues that self-deceit is the accurate premise of this charge.Compared with Williams,whose concern is limited to practical deliberation on so-called typically virtuous actions,this article counters Williams’s doubt about the reflexive elements of deliberation by arguing for another kind of reflexive practical deliberation that remains hidden to his view.This different kind of deliberation is enmeshed with Confucian notions of self-cultivation and its importance for moral psychology.It seeks to contribute a significant insight for traditional Western understandings of ethics.