盘诘、真理与真诚——重审弗拉斯托的苏格拉底“标准盘诘”解释

Elenchus,Truth,and Sincerity:Rethinking Gregory Vlastos’ interpretation of the "Standard Elenchus" of Socrates

盘诘法是苏格拉底进行哲学探究的标志性方法。以弗拉斯托为代表的英美主流解释主张“标准”形式的盘诘法以证成道德真理为目标,并且认为盘诘法对对话双方的“真诚”提出了规则性的要求,以确保其结论能够实现这一目标。但由于预设了过于智识化和道德化的解释立场,标准解释混淆了苏格拉底在《高尔吉亚》和《美诺》等对话中明确区分的“实践成真”和“知识证成”这两个独立的盘诘目标,忽视了“知识”和“真诚”的德性维度以及它们同善意、羞耻等交互性、情感性因素的关联。恢复被标准解释掩盖的盘诘法的多元性将允许我们从一种更统一的德性论视角来理解柏拉图早中期对话中的思想方法。

The elenchus is the hallmark method of Socrates’philosophical investigation.Mainstream Anglo-American interpretation,championed by Gregory Vlastos,holds that the"standard"form of elenchus aims at establishing moral truth,and that in order to secure this aim it sets rule-like requirements of sincerity for both participants.But due to its presupposition of an intellectualistic and moralized standpoint,the standard interpretation confuses two independent goals of the elenchus as distinguished by Socrates in the Gorgias and Meno,namely justification of knowledge and establishment of practical truth.Moreover,it neglects the virtue-dimension of"knowledge"and"sincerity"and their link with reciprocal and emotional factors such as goodwill and shame.Recovering the diversity of elenchus supressed by the standard interpretation allows us to understand the philosophical method in Plato’s early and middle dialogues in a more unitarian,virtue-based framework.