数字经济时代标准必要专利许可三方演化博弈研究

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysison FRAND Licensing of Standard Essential Patents in the Digital Economy Era

数字经济时代标准必要专利公平合理的许可是维持市场稳定、增进社会福祉的关键议题。本文在构建政府、标准必要专利许可企业、标准必要专利实施企业三方博弈模型的基础上,利用动态演化博弈分析了三方的互动机制与稳定策略,并以实际案例为背景进行了仿真模拟。结果表明:(1)政府部门“监管”、许可企业“FRAND许可”、实施企业“缴费”是理想的演化稳定策略;(2)政府部门策略选择具有稳定性,许可企业具有学习性,实施企业具有独立性和快速性;(3)政府部门不监管时,企业会去寻求法律支持,诉讼成功概率和收益影响双方策略选择;(4)政府部门降低监管成本并增大处罚力度,能够为博弈向理想状态演化提供可靠路径。研究结果可以为推进相关产业健康有序发展提供借鉴与参考。

In the era of digital economy, fair and reasonable licensing of standard essential patents is a key to maintaining market stability and enhance social welfare. Based on constructing the tripartite game model of government departments, standard essential patent licensing enterprises and standard essential patent implementing enterprises, this study analyzes the interaction mechanism and stability strategies of the three parties by using dynamic evolutionary game and carries out the simulation with the actual case as the background. The results are as follows.(1) Supervision by government departments FRAND licensing by licensing enterprises, and payment by implementing enterprises are an ideal evolutionary stability strategy;(2) The strategy choice of government departments is stable, that of licensing enterprises is of a learning nature and that of implementing enterprises is independent and fast;(3) When government supervision is absent, enterprises will seek legal support, and the success probability and income of litigation affect the strategic choice of both sides;(4) Government departments can reduce the cost of supervision and increase the intensity of punishment in order to provide the game evolution with a reliable path toward ideal state. The research results can provide reference for promoting the healthy and orderly development of related industries.