交叉持股、企业竞争与双向进入遏制

Cross-holdings,Competition and Bi-direction Entry-deterrence

交叉持股使相关企业利润关联性增强,影响企业的产量竞争,进而也会影响潜在竞争企业的市场进入决策以及在位企业的进入遏制行为。本文基于序贯博弈模型和市场进入模型,考虑位于两个独立市场上的企业均有动机进入对方市场谋求竞争收益的情形。借助逆向归纳法和均衡分析法,本文得到在位企业和潜在进入企业之间可以通过交叉持股协议有效地实现对彼此的进入遏制,从而维持在位企业的市场势力。这是对产业组织理论中传统进入遏制方法的有力补充,也为竞争与反垄断政策的研究与制定等奠定了重要的微观理论基础。

Cross-holdings will enhance the correlation of firms’profits,which inevitably affects firms’quantity competition and further changes the entry decision of the entrant firm together with the deterrence strategy of the incumbent firm.Based on sequential-game model and market entry model,we build up a two-period market entry model in which two firms in two separated markets intend to enter each other’s market to make profits.By backward induction and equilibrium analysis,this paper finds that,in equilibrium,the incumbent strategically offers the potential entrant a contract with positive bilateral cross-holdings to maintain monopoly,which results in a maximum joint profit for both firms.In this way,the entrant firm accepts the contract and stays out.Our results will be a powerful supplement to the traditional approach of entry-deterrence in the industrial organization theory,and also lay an important micro theoretical foundation for the research and formulation of competition and anti-monopoly policies.