考虑低碳努力的双渠道供应链协调契约研究

Coordination Contract in a Dual Channel Supply Chain with Low Carbon Efforts

随着国家碳减排政策的实施和网络购物的发展,制造商进行低碳努力并通过双渠道销售产品。现有研究仅单方面关注双渠道供应链的低碳或协调问题,而忽视了考虑低碳努力的双渠道供应链协调契约研究。鉴于此,本文考虑制造商的低碳努力,构建了双渠道供应链博弈模型,分别求解制造商和零售商在批发价格契约与收益共享契约下的最优决策。研究发现,制造商偏好批发价格契约,零售商偏好收益共享契约。相比收益共享契约,供应链整体利润和制造商的低碳努力在批发价格契约中较高,但上述契约均不能实现供应链协调。本文设计的带补偿的收益共享契约可以实现双渠道供应链的协调,且补偿额取决于制造商和零售商的相对议价能力。本文探讨了需求转移、消费者环保意识和相对议价能力对成员利润和制造商低碳努力的影响,发现面对市场变化,制造商的反应更敏捷,零售商的应对更有效。

With the implementation of national carbon emission reduction policies and the development of online shopping,manufacturers are engaged in low-carbon efforts and sell products through dual channel.Existing researches only focus on low-carbon or coordination in a dual-channel supply chain,while ignoring dual-channel supply chain coordination contracts with low-carbon efforts.In view of this:(1)This paper considers the manufacturer’s low-carbon efforts,and establishes a dual-channel supply chain game model to solve the equilibrium decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer under the wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract.It finds that the manufacturer prefers wholesale price contract,and the retailer prefers revenue sharing contract.Compared to the revenue sharing contract,the overall profit of the supply chain and the low-carbon efforts of the manufacturer are higher under the wholesale price contract,but the above contracts cannot coordinate the dual-channel supply chain.(2)The revenue-sharing contract with compensation designed in this paper can realize the coordination of the dual-channel supply chain,and the compensation amount depends on the relative bargaining power of the manufacturer and the retailer.(3)This paper explores the impact of demand shift,consumer environmental awareness and relative bargaining power on member profits and manufacturer’s low carbon efforts.It is found that in the face of market changes,the manufacturer is more agile and the retailer’s response is more effective.