打开柔性契约与代理人行为间的“薛定谔黑箱”——基于委托代理与契约参照点的竞争中介模型

Opening Schr?dinger Black Box between Flexible Contracts and Behavior:——A Competitive Mediation Model Based on Principal-Agent and Contracts as Reference Points

对委托代理分析范式的拉卡多斯批判揭示,在柔性契约与代理人行为之间横亘着"薛定谔黑箱"。本研究放松了科斯式再谈判的辅助性假设,整合契约参照点与委托代理分析范式,构建了有调价冲突存在的竞争中介模型,以期揭示柔性契约与代理人行为之间存在的两条效应相反的作用路径。来自213份建设项目样本的实证结果表明:控制调价冲突后,柔性契约能够改善代理人行为;调价冲突负向中介了柔性契约与代理人行为改善的关系;柔性契约是代理人尽善履约的必要非充分条件。本研究为实践中科学使用柔性契约提供了理论指导与管理启示。

The Lakatos’criticism of principal-agent analysis paradigm reveals that there exists a"Schr?dinger black box"between flexible contracts and agents’behavior.The study loosens the auxiliary assumption of Coase-style renegotiation,and integrates the analytical paradigm of principal-agent and contract reference point to build a competitive mediation model with price adjustments conflict as the mediator to explore the two opposing mechanism of how flexible contracts affecting agents’behavior.Empirical test results based on 213 valid samples of construction project transactions show that first,controlling the price adjustments conflict,flexible contracts could improve agents’behavior;second,the price adjustments conflict plays a negative mediating role between flexible contracts and agents’behavior and;third,the flexible contracts is the necessary,but not sufficient,condition for improvement of agents’behavior.The findings of this study provide theoretical guidance and management implication for using the flexible contracts scientifically in practice.