管理层盈余预测类型与内部人交易行为

Management Earnings Forecasts and Insider Trading

管理层盈余预测作为企业的业绩预告之一,具有缓解信息不对称的作用;对公司管理层和资本市场投资者均会产生十分重大的影响。本文从内部人交易这一独特的视角研究了管理层盈余预测过程中的机会主义行为。研究结果表明,管理层盈余预测有利于公司内部人的择机交易,公司发布利好的盈余预测消息后,公司内部人选择卖出自身股票,内部人卖出交易与管理层盈余预测好消息呈现出显著正相关关系,内部人交易与盈余预测之间的正相关性仅体现为董事会成员组别。进一步的研究发现,机构投资者和分析师跟踪等外部公司治理机制能够抑制公司内部人的择时交易行为。

As one of the mechanisms to reduce the information asymmetry,management earnings forecast is of great significance to investors and management.This paper studies the relationship between insider trading and management earnings forecasts.The results show that insider sell trading has a significant positive relationship with management earnings forecast when companies disclose the good news earning forecast,which conforms to the information hierarchy hypothesis.Furthermore,the significant relationship between insider sell trading and management earnings forecast is centralized in the board members sub-sample.We further finds that the effective mechanism of external corporate governance weakens insider selling.