平台互联互通的法理问题与监管限度

随着开放共享的平台生态转向以代码为界的“围墙花园”,全球范围内正掀起一场以行政命令替代私人契约以实现平台互联互通的管制和反垄断浪潮。仔细审视互联互通与平台经济的适配性,不难发现在私人部门商业竞争中强制互联互通既缺乏正当性基础,也不符合法经济学视角下收益大于成本的基本约束。强制互联互通将降低用户多栖概率,数据流量集聚大型平台进而削弱“为市场竞争”。虽有助于提高增量创新,却无法实现甚至阻碍更具价值的激进创新。业务交互和数据传输频次的增加也同步提高平台信息系统的损害风险和用户隐私泄露的系数。此外,互联互通在具体实施中还面临流量定价、责任分配和监管方式选择等难以妥善解决的困境。鉴于此,我国目前不宜课予平台互联互通的事前管制义务,可在谦抑原则指导下依据反垄断法的拒绝交易条款事后逐案审查。

As the landscape of open and shared platforms undergoes a shift towards a"walled garden"defined by code,there has been a surge in regulatory and antitrust efforts around the world to replace private contracts with administrative orders to promote platform interconnection.However,a closer examination of the suitability of interconnection for the platform economy reveals that forced interconnection in the context of private sector business competition is not justified and does not comply with the basic constraint of cost-benefit analysis from a law and economic perspective.Forced interconnection may reduce the likelihood of multiple users and the concentration of data traffic on larger platforms,thereby weakening competition for market share.Although it may foster incremental innovation,its facilitation or hindrance of more valuable radical innovation remains uncertain.Additionally,increased frequency of business transactions and data transfers may heighten the risk of damage to platform information systems and increase the coefficient of user privacy leakage.Furthermore,interoperability presents difficult dilemmas in concrete implementation of traffic pricing,allocation of responsibilities,and choice of regulatory approaches,which are challenging to adequately address.Therefore,imposing ex-ante control obligations on platform interconnection is not advisable,and ex-post review on a case-bycase basis in accordance with the refusal to deal clause in antitrust law under the guidance of the principle of modesty should be implemented.