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悬置判断“谜团”的本体论预设

The Puzzle about Withholding
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摘要 设想某人可以理解一个命题,但是没有任何相关证据。此时,专家们却建议不要悬置判断,他该何去何从呢?似乎无论哪种态度都不合适:一方面,没有证据,就不应该相信;另一方面,按照专家们的意见,悬置判断是不恰当的。对此谜团有多种回应方式:建议本身就不合适,没必要理会;此人仍应悬置判断;此人应完全抛开该命题,不采取任何态度等等。其中某个或某些回应可能是正确的,但至少都是不完备的。它们背后都隐含了某种对悬置判断的理解。此谜团实质上乃是一个关于悬置判断本质的谜团。只有回答了悬置判断到底是什么,才能彻底解开它。 Suppose you can understand a proposition P,but has no evidence on it.At the same time,you’ve got advice from a group of experts.They said that you should not suspend judging on P.What should you do then?It seems that no attitude is appropriate.You should not believe P or not-P for you have no evidence on it.You should not suspend judging for the advice from experts.There can be many responses to this puzzle.Maybe the advice is not appropriate,you should leave them aside;maybe you should still suspend judging;maybe you should discard the proposition,not think it anymore.Some responses are reasonable or right,but none is complete.In fact,it is a puzzle about the nature of the suspension of judgment.Unless we know what exactly suspension of judgment is,there’s no way to solve it.At the same time,this puzzle gives us a clue on what suspension of judgment really is.
作者 舒卓 SHU Zhuo(School of Marxism,Zhejiang University of Technology,Hangzhou 310023,China)
出处 《自然辩证法研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2021年第8期16-22,共7页 Studies in Dialectics of Nature
基金 浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题“关于证据本性的哲学考察”(18NDJC211YB) 教育部人文社科青年基金“哲学视域下的证据本性问题研究”(18YJC720018)
关键词 悬置判断/悬搁判断 证据主义 认知困境 置信度 suspension of judgment/withhold evidentialism epistemic dilemma credence/confidence/degree of belief
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