摘要
自然主义者认为心理事物或属性原则上都可以还原为物理事物或属性。将心理内容、意义、意向性还原到物理被称为语义内容的自然化。德雷斯基试图以信息内容作为语义内容的自然化的起点,但其理论在自然化上有着循环的嫌疑。罗伊、科恩和明斯基分别提出了两种与之不同的信息内容的反事实理论,并认为该理论有着自然化优势。通过分析信息内容的反事实理论在自然化上的争论,我们可以给出一个新的论证,它可以揭露出在自然化意义上,新近的反事实理论并没有理论优势可言。
Naturalists believe that mental things and properties can, in principle, be reduced to physical things and properties. Reducing content, meaning, and intentionality to the physical is called naturalizing semantic content. Dretske proposed the informational content as his first step for naturalizing semantic content. However, his theory is suspected of resulting in circulation on naturalization. Loewer, Cohen and Minsky put forward two other counterfactual theories of informational content, believing that these theories have theoretical advantages of naturalization. Analyzing these debates on naturalizing informational content, we can propose a new argument, which could reveal that the recent counterfactual theories have no theoretical advantages for the purpose of naturalization.
作者
朱帆
ZHU Fan(School of Philosophy,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100048,China)
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第6期20-25,共6页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社科基金项目“当代物理主义世界观研究”(14BZX115)
关键词
信息内容
语义内容
反事实条件句
自然主义
informational content
semantic content
counterfactuals
naturalism