真理论论证中的预设性谬误:以融贯论为例

Fallacies of Presumption in the Argument of Theories of Truth: Take the Coherence Theory of Truth as an Example

"真"这一概念的特殊性决定了我们并不能合法地评判一个对真的定义是否为真。然而,真理论领域内很多意见的表达却忽视了真理论论证的这一界限,他们用隐含某种真理论立场的论证来反驳另一种真理论观点,由此犯下窃取论题的预设性谬误。通过分析和举例,我们将发现很多试图反驳融贯论的论证实际上预先假定了另一种真理论立场成立,这些反驳因而并不能视作是对融贯论的有效攻击。而即使将这些被预设的立场理解成人们对真的直觉,并以这些直觉作为评价真理论的标准之时,我们仍须警惕同样的谬误的发生。

The particularity of the concept of "truth" determines that we cannot legitimately judge whether a definition of truth is true. However, many debates in the field of theories of truth often ignore this boundary of the argument of theories of truth, and some people even beg the question by using arguments that imply a certain understanding of truth to refute another theory of truth. Through analysis and examples, we will find that many arguments that attempt to refute coherence theory of truth actually presuppose another viewpoint of truth, and those refutations therefore cannot be regarded as effective attacks on the coherence theory of truth. What’s more, even when we understand these presupposed positions as people’s intuitions about truth, and use these intuitions as the criteria for evaluating theories of truth, we must still be alert to the same fallacy.