摘要
诉诸自然齐一性反驳休谟关于归纳问题的怀疑论立场,需要自然类理论研究的支持。蒯因提出一种关于自然类的"消去主义",他潜在地接受一个无需诉诸自然齐一性回应归纳问题的立场。然而,蒯因的立场依赖投射性概念,不可能避开自然齐一性;类本质主义可以反驳"消去主义",为自然齐一性提供一定的辩护。康布里特基于"自我平衡性质说"回应归纳问题,他接受一种弱的自然齐一性,但是他的方案难以摆脱关于归纳的解释循环。类本质主义和"自我平衡性质簇说"都采用描述自然对象性质的方法解释自然类,而从关于性质的形而上学研究来看,它们都存在解释划分或使用自然类的实际的问题。关注关于自然类的新解释,有可能为研究归纳问题带来一些新的启示。
To argue against the Humean skeptical stance of induction,it is necessary to get support from studies of natural kinds.Quine suggests a natural kind eliminativism.He accepts potentially a stance,which argues to deal with the problem of induction without considering uniformity of nature.However,Quine’s stance depends on the concept of projectibility,and thus,can’t live without reference of uniformity of nature;the stance may get its support from anti-essentialism,but kind-essentialism is capable of refuting eliminativism and defending for uniformity of nature.Kornblith tries to solve the induction problem on the basis of homeostatic property cluster account.He accepts a kind of weak uniformity of nature and fulfills it with so-called"categorical structure",but his proposal is trapped in the hermeneutic circle of explaining induction.Kind essentialism and"homeostatic property cluster account"are common in defining natural kinds by describing properties of natural objects.According to studies of the metaphysics of property,they are both in trouble of generalizing the facts of sorting or using natural kinds.Focusing on new explanations of natural kinds,it is possible to get more insights for studying the problem of induction.
作者
张存建
ZHANG Cunjian(Department of Philosophy,Jiangsu Normal University,Xuzhou,Jiangsu,221116)
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第2期23-28,共6页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金
江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目“自然种类的形而上学研究”(项目编号:2018SJA0948)
国家社科基金项目后期资助项目“规范推理主义研究:以布兰顿语言哲学为例”(项目编号:19FZXB038).
关键词
归纳问题
自然类
自然齐一性
类本质主义
自我平衡性质簇说
The induction problem
Natural kinds
Uniformity of nature
Kind essentialism
Homeostatic property cluster account