期刊文献+

高管层自利与业绩承诺协议——基于中国上市公司的经验证据 被引量:4

Executive Self-interest and Performance Commitment Contracts:Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies
原文传递
导出
摘要 随着业绩承诺协议逐渐成为推动上市公司并购重组顺利完成的重要契约安排,探讨其签订及条款设置的动因非常必要。本文以2011—2016年签订业绩承诺协议且已完成的境内并购事件为研究样本,检验高管层自利对业绩承诺协议签订及其条款设置的影响。研究发现,高管层自利程度越高,在并购重组中越倾向于签订业绩承诺协议;而在对业绩承诺协议具体条款设置的影响上,高管层自利程度与业绩承诺门槛呈显著负相关关系;高管层自利程度越高,在业绩补偿内容方面越倾向于设置"补利润"条款,在业绩补偿方式方面越倾向于设置现金补偿条款。进一步研究发现,在公司内部控制质量低、信息透明度低以及并购重组为关联交易的情况下,高管层在并购重组过程中更倾向于通过业绩承诺协议签订及其条款设置来谋求个人利益;并且发现,高管层自利不仅降低了业绩承诺协议签订及其条款设置对公司短期和长期并购绩效的积极影响,也降低了业绩承诺协议签订及其条款设置对高管层货币薪酬水平的积极影响。本文明确了业绩承诺协议签订及其条款设置的一个重要动因在于,高管层试图通过促成并购重组交易来获取更多的个人利益,不但从契约条款层面揭示了业绩承诺协议产生特定经济后果的关键作用机制,而且对近年来频发的业绩承诺未达标和条款变更的现象给出了解释。 As the performance commitment contract(PCC)becomes an important contract arrangement to promote the M&As of listed companies,it is necessary to make a study on the motivation of its signing and related clauses setting.This paper takes the domestic M&As that have been completed and signed the PCC from 2011 to 2016 as the samples,to test the impact of executive self-interest on PCC signing and related clauses setting.The results show that the more self-interested executives are,the more likely they are to sign the PCC in M&As;In terms of the influence on the setting of specific clauses,executive self-interest is significantly and negatively correlated with the performance commitment hurdle,the more self-interested executives are,the more inclined they are to set the"compensate the profits"clause in the content of performance compensation,and set the"cash compensation"clause in the method of performance compensation.Further research finds that when the company with low quality of internal control,low information transparency and related transaction,executives are more inclined to seek self-interest through the signing and clauses setting of PCC.Moreover,this paper finds that the executive self-interest not only reduces the positive impact of PCC on M&A performance,but also reduces the positive impact on the monetary compensation.This paper makes clear that the reason of PCC has been signed and related clauses have been set,is the executive attempts to obtain more self-interest,not only reveals the key mechanism of understanding how PCC have specific economic consequences,but also explains the reasons why PCC failed and changed frequently in recent years.
作者 杨超 宋迪 谢志华 CHAO YANG;DI SONG;ZHIHUA XIE
出处 《中国会计评论》 2019年第4期559-604,共46页 China Accounting Review
基金 国家社科基金重点项目(14AJY005) 国家社科基金重大项目(14ZDA027) 北京市社科基金重大项目(15ZDA51) 国有资产管理协同创新项目(GZ20130801)的资助
关键词 高管层自利 业绩承诺协议 业绩承诺门槛 业绩补偿内容 业绩补偿方式 Executive Self-interest Performance Commitment Contracts Performance Commitment Hurdle Content of Performance Compensation Method of Performance Compensation
  • 相关文献

参考文献57

二级参考文献985

共引文献7221

同被引文献90

引证文献4

二级引证文献10

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部