上市公司董事质押股份之权能分离与弥合机制

The Separation and Bridging Mechanism of the Power of Directors’Pledged Shares

为了应对实践中上市公司董事通过质押股份规避限期不得转让规定的情形,《公司法》第160条新增限制行使质权的规定,但应当如何解释适用以充分发挥其治理功能殊值探究。董事质押股份会导致股权结构发生变化,即现金流权权能要素和表决权权能要素发生背离。鉴于董事身份的特殊性,这一权能分离极有可能引发公司治理风险,进而增加代理成本,侵害公司利益。对此,我国当前的法律回应聚焦于信息披露等监管策略,以及董事义务和责任等组织治理策略,前者的主要目标在于风险提示,后者则需要借助司法适用对董事质押股份的风险进行回应,但因为“勤勉义务”适用标准的不确定性而功效受限。尽管可以经由司法治理间接弥合分离风险,但出于商事效率之考量,更应当基于公司治理目的进行体系解释,通过有针对性的组织治理策略予以直接回应。具体而言,应当通过比例限制措施对董事表决权予以限制,这与我国现行法中已有的限制表决权规范的规制目标一致。可供选择的解释方案是董事质押超过持有股份二分之一的部分不得行使表决权,该限制措施应当配置为倡导性的章程自治事项,避免规制刚性。

In order to respond to the situation in practice that directors of listed companies circumvent the prohibition on transfer within the time limit by pledging shares,Article 160 of the Company Law adds a new provision restricting the exercise of pledge rights,but the effect of this new provision is relatively limited.The pledge of shares by directors of public companies will lead to changes in the equity structure,that is,the elements of cash flow right and voting right will deviate from each other.In view of the particularity of the identity of directors,it is very likely to cause corporate governance risks,thereby increasing agency costs and infringing the interests of the company.China’s current legal response focuses on regulatory strategies such as information disclosure,and organizational governance strategies such as directors’obligations and responsibilities.The former’s main goal is to prompt risks,while the latter needs to respond to the risks of directors’pledged shares through judicial application,but its effectiveness is limited due to the uncertainty of the applicable standards of“diligence obligations”.Although the risk of separation can be bridged indirectly through judicial governance,based on the pursuit of efficiency,it should be responded directly through clear and specific organizational governance strategies.Specifically,the voting rights of directors should be restricted based on the proportional restriction measures,which is consistent with the normative legal logic of restricting voting rights existing in China’s current law.The pledge of more than half of the shares held by the directors shall not exercise the voting rights.This restriction measure should be configured as an advocacy of the autonomy of the articles of association to avoid regulatory rigidity.