多群体非对称演化博弈动力学及其在智能电网电力需求侧响应中的应用

Multi-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics and Its Applications in Power Demand-side Response in Smart Grid

基于有限理性和有限信息假设,演化博弈论近年来在工程领域非完全理性行为决策问题中得到了初步应用。基于此,针对多群体用户参与电网智能用电调配时面临的电力需求响应(electric power demand-side response,EPDR)非对称行为决策问题,首先利用演化博弈论中的复制者动态概念建立一般情形下的N群体非对称演化博弈(n-population asymmetric evolutionary game,n PAEG)模型。然后,提出基于n PAEG的EPDR模型及其求解算法。算例研究表明:通过用户种群间不断的动态交互决策,供电实体如电力公司等提供合理丰厚的电价激励对促进用户种群参与智能用电调配起到关键作用,而其他因素如种群规模和数量、用户初始参与度、舒适度效用函数及其参数设置等也在一定程度上影响用户参与智能用电调配。该结果可为研究工程领域尤其是智能电网领域内非完全理性参与人的行为决策问题提供一些思路与理论参考。

Based on the assumptions of bounded rationality and limited information,evolutionary game theory(EGT)has recently been preliminarily applied to the problem of decision making for imperfectly rational behavior in engineering field.Based on this,first,a general n-population asymmetric evolutionary game(nPAEG)model was developed by using the concept of replicator dynamics in EGT to address the asymmetric electric power demand-side response(EPDR)decision problem faced by multiple groups of residential users participating in smart power consumption,dispatching and distribution(SPCDD).Then,the nPAEG-based EPDR model and its solution algorithm known as nPAEG algorithm were proposed.The case study indicates that appropriate and attractive incentive pricing from grid companies plays a crucial role in enhancing different user groups to actively participate in SPCDD and meanwhile,other factors such as population size,number of populations,initial user engagement,and comfort utility functions and their parameter settings can also influence user participation to a certain extent.The results can provide some thoughts and theoretical references for investigating the behavioral decision issues of incomplete rational participants in the engineering field specifically when it is used in the smart grid field.