债权结构、破产决策机制与企业价值

Debt Structure,Bankruptcy Decision Mechanism and Firm Value

本文研究债权结构、破产决策机制对企业价值的影响。针对可能出现的两类破产决策错误——第一类错误是“应当破产却选择不破产”,第二类错误是“不应破产却选择破产”——本文研究发现:第一,在债权结构方面,引入过多的次级债权人或大债权人,会导致“过少”的破产清算,使第一类错误的概率增加;相反,引入过多的优先债权人或小债权人,则会导致“过多”的破产清算,使第二类错误的概率增加。最优的债权结构取决于两方面效应的平衡。第二,在破产决策机制方面,过低的决定性多数值将增加第一类错误的概率,相反过高的决定性多数值则增加第二类错误的概率。最优的破产决策规则应根据不同债权结构特征的企业进行调整,使能够做出最优决策的债权人成为最终起决定性作用的“多数人”。本文为理解债权结构、破产决策机制与企业价值之间的关系,提供了一个一般性的理论框架。

This paper studies the influence of debt structure and bankruptcy decision mechanism on firm value.In view of two types of possible bankruptcy decision errors-the first type is“should go bankrupt but choose not to go bankrupt”,and the second type is“should not go bankrupt but choose to go bankrupt”-this paper finds that:first,the introduction of too many junior creditors or large creditors will lead to“too few”liquidation,increasing the probability of the first type of errors;On the contrary,if too many senior creditors or small creditors are introduced,it will lead to“too many”liquidation and increase the probability of the second type of errors.The optimal debt structure depends on the balance of the two effects.Second,a low critical value of the voting at creditors'meetings will increase the probability of the first type of error,while a high critical value will increase the probability of the second type of error.The optimal bankruptcey decision mechanism should be adjusted according to the firm with different debt structure characteristics,so that the creditors who can make the optimal decision become the decisive role in the voting.This paper provides a general theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between debt structure,bankruptcy decision mechanism and firm value.