不完全契约与担保债务合同的最优结构

Incomplete Contract and the Optimal Structure of Secured Debt Contract

本文从不完全契约的观点出发,研究了担保债务合同的最优结构以及担保债务下的企业治理决策问题。研究主要发现:(1)担保权利作为债权人控制企业资产和相关责任财产的手段,与债务人生产经营效率有紧密的关系。(2)合意的非充分担保比率是权衡企业偿付可置信性与资产价值(或债务偿付能力)的结果,与企业收益的“风险”没有直接的关系。(3)若担保条款可产生足够的长期合约内收益,它就能够支撑偿付路径较慢的长期债务;担保比率较低和债务偿付路径较快的债务合同,则适合于短期私人收益较高、担保条款对企业生产经营能力抑制较大的场合。(4)较高的破产交易成本和企业资产专用性程度,会导致事前较高的担保需求。本文就担保权利、担保债务合同结构与企业治理决策之间的关系,给出了一个一般性的理论框架,弥补了现有理论在解释担保权利方面的缺失。

Based on incomplete contract theory,this paper investigates the optimal structure of secured debt contract and governance decisions of corporations with secured debt The main findings are as follows:(1)As a means for the creditor to control corporate assets and related liability properties,the security right is closely related to the debtor’s production and operation efficiency.(2)The acceptable insufficient security ratio is the result of weighing the reliability of corporate repayment and asset value(or debt solvency),but does not directly relate to the"risk"of corporate earnings.(3)If the security clauses can generate enough earnings in the long-term contract,it can support the long-term debt with slow repayment;Debt contracts with low security ratios and fast debt repayments are suitable in circumstances of high short-term private returns of debtors and great inhibition from security clauses on the production and operation efficiency of debtors.(4)Higher bankruptcy transaction costs and higher levels of corporate asset specificity will lead to higher demand of creditors for security in contracts.This paper suggests a general theoretical framework on the relationship among the security rights,secured debt contract structures and corporate governance decisions,filling a theoretical gap in explaining security rights.