谁来制定规则:一个广义上的立法权力最优配置理论

Who Will Make the Rules:A General Theory of Optimal Allocation of Legislative Power

本文从理论的角度,回答了以下的问题:谁应该拥有决定制度规则的权力?什么因素影响着这种广义上的立法权力的配置?如何配置决定制度规则的权力,才能够得到与社会利益相一致的制度规则?基于科斯定理,本文运用数理模型证明了以下的命题:假定制度规则的制定和执行成本为零且允许人们相互进行交易,那么不论资产所有权如何配置,只要制度变化对资产价值的边际影响极容易测量,那么制度由谁来制定、以何种方式制定,实际上是无关紧要的,都能得到使资产价值最大化的制度规则;当假定不再成立时,决定使用哪种制度规则的权力,就应该赋予对制度规则带来的资产价值变化最敏感的一方,以及具有最低制定成本和执行成本的一方。本文研究将立法权力的最优配置与社会的资产所有权结构联系了起来。最后,本文结合中国"法治政府建设"的现状,提出了相关的政策建议。

From the theoretical point of view,this paper answers the following questions:who should have the power to determine the rules of the society?What factors affect the allocation of such a general legislative power?How to allocate the power so as to get the rules which are consistent with the social interests?Based on Coase’s theorem,this paper uses mathematical model to prove the following propositions:assuming that the cost of making and implementing rules is zero and people are allowed to trade with each other,no matter who owns the assets,as long as the marginal influence of institutional change on asset value is easily measured,then who makes the rules and how it is made,is irrelevant,the optimal rules will always be chosen.When the assumption is no longer tenable,the power to decide which rules to use should be given to the men who are most sensitive to the change of asset value brought by the rules,as well as the men with the lowest formulation cost and execution cost.In this paper,we can find that the optimal allocation of legislative power is connected with the ownership structure of assets in a society.Finally,this paper puts forward policy suggestions for"the reform of the rule of law government"in China.