地方政府竞争、规制扭曲与劳动报酬份额——理论框架与经验证据

Distortion of Environmental Regulations and Reduction of Labor Remuneration Shares under Local Government Competition——Theoretical Framework and Empirical Evidence

规制扭曲与劳动者报酬份额持续下降是中国经济增长高速背景下的两个并行现象,二者具有统一的内在关系,其受到中国式制度安排与增长方式的统一制约。本文在税收竞争框架内引入资本要素禀赋以体现区域差异,构造模型分析地方政府竞争对规制扭曲与劳动者报酬份额的影响以及资本禀赋在其中发挥的作用,并利用历史数据实证检验这一影响。研究表明,地方政府竞争具有降低规制水平倾向,但资本禀赋具有缓解这一倾向的调节作用;地方政府竞争对劳动者报酬份额的影响具有区域差异,相对而言中部地区的地方政府竞争有降低劳动者报酬份额的倾向,资本禀赋仍然发挥了缓解地方政府竞争影响的调节作用。基于研究结论,有效利用地区间资本禀赋差异对竞争机制的影响,并据此因循诱导、改善当前地方政府竞争机制是纠正劳动者报酬持续降低与规制扭曲的根本之路。

Regulatory distortions and Labor Compensation Share of GDP declining are two parallel phenomenon in China and both are restricted by the Chinese institutional arrangements and growth mode.In this paper,capital endowment is introduced to the traditional framework of tax competition to reflect regional differences,by which we analyze the impact of local government competition on the supply of regulation and make empirical analysis correspondingly.The result shows that:the competition among local governments has the tendency to reduce regulation level while the capital endowment can ease this tendency;the impact of local government competition on the labor share has demonstrated regional differences,while competition of local government has a tendency to reduce the labor share in the central region.But the capital endowment still plays a role of adjustment of easing the impact of the local government competition.According to this paper,effective use the role of capital endowments in the competition mechanism among local governments,and improve the current mechanism of local government competition are fundamental ways to solve the problem of underpaid compensation for labor and regulation distortion.