摘要
基于2006—2016年中国70个城市的公共服务供给情况和任职的市委书记的详细个人信息,系统地研究了地方官员治理与公共服务供给之间的关系。研究表明,在追求政治晋升激励下,城市官员晋升压力越大,他们就越有可能为个人私利去干预城市公共服务供给,导致公共资源配置效率不佳。并且在晋升锦标赛的模式下,城市官员任期与公共服务供给效率呈现显著的正U型关系,正U型曲线的最低点出现在3.14年处,略低于官员任期的均值。当官员任期较短时,晋升压力会增强官员任期对公共服务供给效率的负效应;而当官员任期延长到对公共服务供给效率起到促进作用时,晋升压力的增大会缓解这一促进效应。进一步的分析表明,官员任期与公共服务供给效率的正U型关系对于上任年龄小于55岁的市委书记更为明显,对于上任年龄大于等于55岁的市委书记则趋于消失。最后根据分析结果提出相应的政策建议。
Based on the public service supply of 70 cities in China and the detailed personal information of the secretaries of the municipal party committee from 2006 to 2016,this paper systematically studies the relationship between the governance of local officials and the public service supply.Studies show that under the incentive of political promotion,the greater the promotion pressure on the officials the more likely they are to intervene in the supply of public services for personal interest,resulting in poor efficiency in the allocation of public resources.Besides,under the promotion championship,urban official tenure and supply efficiency of public service show a significant positive U-shaped relationship,and the lowest point of the curve appears in 3.14 years,which is slightly lower than the average of the official tenure.When the official tenure is short,promotion pressure will increase the negative effect of the official tenure on the efficiency of public service supply;when the official tenure is extended to the period of promoting the efficiency of public service supply,the increase of promotion pressure will alleviate this promotion effect.Further analysis shows that the positive U-shaped relationship between the official tenure and the supply efficiency of public service is more obvious for the municipal party secretaries under 55 years old,and tends to disappear for the municipal party secretaries who are 55 years old or older.Finally,the corresponding policy recommendations are proposed based on the analysis.
作者
杨刚强
程恒祥
吴斯
YANG Gang-qiang;CHENG Heng-xiang;WU Si(Institute for Regional and Rural-Urban Development,Wuhan University,Hubei 430072,China;School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Hubei 430072,China)
出处
《云南财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第2期89-100,共12页
Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部青年基金项目“公共服务资源配置与移民空间选择协同优化的路径及策略研究”(16YJC790076)
国家社会科学基金一般项目“区域外溢性公共品有效供给的财政激励机制研究”(15BJY137).
关键词
晋升压力
官员任期
公共服务供给效率
DEA模型
Promotion Pressure
Official Tenure
Supply Efficiency of Public Service
DEA Model