公司丑闻的强制披露是否影响内外部投资人“用脚投票”和“用手投票”?

Does the Compulsory Disclosure of Corporate Scandal Affect Internal and External Investors to “Vote with Feet”and “Vote with Hands”?

探究公司内外部投资人在面临公司被强制披露丑闻时公司治理的具体行动,构建基于丑闻强制披露的甄别模型和抑制丑闻的公司治理模型,分析丑闻在被强制披露后的信号发送、传递及市场甄别的路径。通过模型分析和实证检验发现,由于内部投资人可在市场中"无差别"自由交易形成丑闻窖藏动机,丑闻的强制披露存在必要性。尽管强制披露丑闻的行动可促进市场对公司的合理定价,并提升公司治理水平,但并不会最终抑制丑闻的产生。此外,尽管丑闻在"用脚投票"上不导致交易扭曲,但强制披露制度对处于信息劣势的外部投资人体现了公平。建议通过提高丑闻的强制披露处罚金额和监督的精准度,以及降低内部投资人在丑闻爆发后的自由交易机会,发挥丑闻作为公司声誉的监督作用。

The paper studies corporate governance actions of internal and external investors when companies are forced to disclose corporate scandals.Screening model based on the compulsory disclosure of corporate scandals and corporate governance model used to control scandals are constructed to analyze the information distribution,transmission and market screening paths.Model analysis and empirical tests show that compulsory disclosure of corporate scandal is necessary because internal investors can make"indiscriminate"trade freely in the market and thus form the motive of scandal hoarding.Although actions to disclosure scandals can help the market to set reasonable prices of the company and improve corporate governance level,they cannot inhibit the generation of the scandals.Besides,although the existence of scandals in"voting with feet"does not lead to trade distortion,the compulsory disclosure system gives fairness to external investors with information disadvantages.The paper suggests that scandals should play the supervision role in company reputation through improving the fines of compulsory disclosure of corporate scandal and the accuracy of supervision,as well as lowering the free trade opportunities of internal investors after the disclosure of scandals.