制度安排与变迁下的中国地方政府债务形成机制——基于博弈分析的一个完整框架

The Formation Mechanism of Local Government Debt in China under Institutional Arrangement and Change: A Complete Framework Based on Game Analysis

制度因素与政策因素是中国地方政府债务形成与不断增长的主要原因。基于制度视角从财政体制、政治体制及财政政策三个方面对中国地方政府债务的成因进行了分析。2005年以后,随着公共财政体制的完善及转移支付制度的规范,地方政府巨额债务的积累已经不能从财政体制方面得到充分地解释;软预算约束下的地方政府间竞争是中国地方政府债务规模不断膨胀的重要原因;在实施财政政策的过程中,中央政府将大量的经济稳定职能赋予地方政府是地方政府债务规模不断膨胀的另一重要原因。破解地方政府债务危局,必须对地方政府的财权与事权分配做出变革,改革地方政府官员的考核晋升机制,建立完备的政府投资法律,多策并举,消除地方政府的负债投资冲动。

Institutional and policy factors are the main reasons for the formation and continuous growth of local government debt in China.Based on the institutional perspective,the paper analyzes the causes of local government debt in China from three aspects including financial system,political system and fiscal policy.After 2005,with the improvement of the public financial system and the standardization of the transfer payment system,the accumulation of huge debts of local governments cannot be fully explained by the public financial system.The competition among local governments under the soft budget constraint is an important reason for the continuous expansion of the debt scale of local governments in China.In the process of implementing fiscal policy,the central government entrusts a large number of economic stability duties to local governments,which is another important reason for the continuous scale expansion of local government debt.To solve the local government debt crisis,it is necessary to change the financial power and administrative power of the local governments,reform the appraisal and promotion mechanism of local government officials,establish a complete government investment law,and take multiple measures simultaneously to eliminate the impulse of local government debt investment.