中国地方政府环境规制非完全执行路径锁定与解锁研究——基于央地分权视角

Research on the Path Locking and Unlocking of the Incomplete Enforcement of Environmental Regulation of Chinese Local Government: From the Perspective of the Decentralization of the Central and the Local Government

以财政分权和政治集权为核心的"中国式分权"导致地方政府在进行环境规制过程中的"策略性"行为,产生环境规制非完全执行普遍性现象。界定了地方政府环境规制非完全执行路径"锁定"与"解锁",分析了路径"锁定"与"解锁"的形成机理,据此构建环境规制非完全执行路径"锁定"两方博弈和路径"解锁"三方博弈模型,证实了中央政府和社会公众引入到环境规制中则是解锁环境规制非完全执行的首要条件。从环境规制垂直管理幅度、绿色政绩考核机制、环境法制建设和多元化环境治理主体机制四方面探讨了环境规制非完全执行路径解锁的途径。

With fiscal decentralization and political centralization as the core, the "Chinese-style decentralization" has led to the "strategic" behavior of local government in environmental regulation, which results in the phenomenon of incomplete enforcement of environmental regulation. The paper defines path "locking" and "unlocking" of incomplete enforcement of environmental regulation, and analyzes the formation mechanism. Based on this, the paper builds the two-party game model of path "locking" and three-party game model of path "unlocking" of the incomplete enforcement of environmental regulation. These two models confirm that the introduction of the central government and the public into environmental regulation the first condition of unlocking the incomplete enforcement. The paper explores the path unlocking of incomplete enforcement of environmental regulation from four aspects, including vertical management range of environmental regulation, green performance evaluation mechanism, construction of environmental legal system and diversified environmental governance subjects.