中国省级环境监察的垂直一体化能有效激励企业改善环境行为吗?

Does vertical administrative integration of environmental monitoring at the provincial level effectively motivate firms to improve environmental behaviour in China?

为应对严重的环境污染,中国一些城市和省份已经实施了省级环境监察垂直一体化改革。本文运用自适应多主体仿真模型,以研究此项改革是否能够有效激励来自污染工业行业的企业改善其环境的行为。仿真结果表明,除非政策制定者能够帮助企业提高融资能力、增加企业补贴并激励企业管理者提高环境意识,否则,该项改革可能不会达到预期的激励企业改善其环境行为的效果。这些研究结论可用于环境监察垂直一体化改革的实践,为改革的最终成功奠定基础。

A few cities and provinces in China have implemented vertical administrative integration of environmental monitoring to the provincial level as a response to severe environmental pollution.This study used an adaptive agent-based simulation model to explore whether the reform might effectively motivate polluting industrial firms to improve their environmental behaviour.Simulation results found that the reform might not effectively motivate the desired improvements in environmental behaviour unless policy-makers improve individual enterprises’financial capacities,enhance their subsidies,and encourage managers to improve their environmental awareness.These findings could be used in the vertical administrative reform efforts to help achieve the reform’s success.