基于演化博弈的政府采用公私合作项目运营监管建模与仿真

Modeling and Simulation of PPP Project Operation Supervision Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

政府采用公私合作(PPP)项目运营中,资本逐利性容易引发私人部门的机会主义行为,严重损害公共福利和社会公众利益。本研究通过引入社会公众,构建以私人部门、政府和社会公众为主体的PPP项目运营监管的三方演化博弈模型,重点分析了博弈各方的策略演化趋势及其渐近稳定策略。同时结合Matlab软件仿真分析了各方策略初始意愿对自身及其他参与方渐近稳定策略的影响。研究表明,政府严格监管和公众积极监督的初始意愿越强,系统演化均衡时私人部门越有可能提供优质的公共产品/服务,并且其策略收敛速度也越快。Matlab软件仿真发现政府监管与公众监督不同,政府监管是公众监督的基础,没有政府监管就不可能存在长期的公众监督。因此,政府应充分调动社会公众的监督积极性,形成PPP项目“政府监管+公众监督”的二元共治模式。

In the operation of PPP projects,the profit seeking nature of capital easily leads to opportunism behavior of the private sector,which seriously damages public welfare and public interests.In response to this issue,a tripartite evolutionary game model for PPP project operation supervision with the private sector,government,and the public as the main body was constructed by introducing the public.The focus was on analyzing the strategy evolution trends and asymptotic stability strategies of all parties involved in the game.At the same time,Matlab was used to simulate the impact of the initial intentions of each party’s strategy on their own and other participants’asymptotic stability strategies.Research has shown that the higher the initial willingness of the government to strictly regulate and the public to actively supervise,the more likely the private sector will be to provide high-quality public goods/services when the system evolves in equilibrium,and its strategy convergence speed will also be faster.More importantly,the simulation found that government regulation is different from public supervision.Government regulation is the fundamental prerequisite for public supervision,and without government regulation,public supervision cannot exist for a long time.Therefore,government should fully mobilize the supervision enthusiasm of the public,and form a dual governance model of"government regulation+public supervision"for PPP projects.