产品绿色创新决策与绿色渠道激励机制设计

Product Green Innovation Decisions and Green Channel Incentive Mechanism Design

在单个制造商和单个零售商组成的二级绿色渠道中,基于博弈模型分析集中和分散决策下的博弈均衡,研究非价格因素的变化对产品绿色创新水平、定价与利润的影响,设计激励契约实现产品绿色创新水平与订货量的同时协调。研究表明,在两种模式下,增加产品潜在市场需求、增强消费者的环境意识、降低消费者的价格敏感性或者采用新技术降低单位产品生产成本及绿色投资成本,能够提高产品绿色创新水平、增加渠道成员利润;收入共享契约不能实现产品绿色创新水平与订货量的同时协调,而两部定价契约能够实现产品绿色创新水平与订货量同时达到集中决策时的协调状态。值得注意的是,单位成本的增加不一定引起产品价格的上升,这取决于消费者的价格敏感性。

In a two-level green channel consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer,the paper analyzes game equilibrium under centralized and decentralized decision making based on game theory and investigates the impacts of changes in non-price factors on product green innovation,pricing and profits.Further,it designs an incentive contract to coordinate the level of product green innovation and order quantity simultaneously in green channel.The results indicate that,the level of green innovation and channel members’profits can be improved by increasing the market potential,strengthening consumer’s environmental awareness,decreasing consumer’s price sensitivity,or using new technologies to reduce per-unit cost and greening investment cost.It also finds that,revenue sharing contract cannot coordinate the level of green innovation and order quantity to the status of integrated case simultaneously,but two-part tariff contract can achieve.It is worth mentioning that the increase of unit cost does not necessarily cause the price of products to rise,which depends on the price sensitivity of consumer demand.