中央环境规制是否引发“边界效应”?——基于区域环保督查制度实施的一个准自然实验研究

Does Centralized Environmental Regulation Trigger“Boundary Effects”?——A Quasi-natural Experimental Study Based on the Implementation of a Regional Environmental Inspection System

中央环境规制在改善生态环境的同时,会引发污染企业空间布局的“边界效应”。论文以区域环保督查制度的实施效果为例,基于2003—2010年中国31个省份1413个县域的面板数据,利用渐进双重差分方法实证检验了区域环保督查制度下的省际跨界河流污染“边界效应”,并引入调节因素来理解污染“边界效应”何以存在地区差异。研究结论表明,区域环保督查制度实施后,边界企业污染活动显著多于非边界地区。经由调节模型分析发现,信息不对称强化了区域环保督查制度对污染“边界效应”的刺激。本文为中央环境规制的“边界效应”问题提供了直接的微观经验证据,相关部门在未来中央环境规制的制定和落实过程中,应关注地方政府的执行动机和利益偏好,通过降低纵向信息不对称性来克服激励不相容和不确定性问题而带来的代理成本。

While improving the ecological environment,centralized environmental regulation may trigger the“boundary effect”of the spatial distribution of polluting enterprises.Taking the implementation effect of the regional environmental protection inspection system as an example,the paper using the staggered DID(Difference in Difference)method to empirically examine the inter-provincial cross-border river pollution“boundary effect”under the regional environmental protection inspection system based on the panel data of 1,413 counties in 31 provinces of China from 2003 to 2010,and introduces the moderating factors to understand why there are regional differences in the pollution“boundary effect”.The conclusion of the study shows that after the implementation of the regional environmental inspection system,the polluting activities of the border enterprises are significantly more than those of the non-border areas.The moderating model reveals that information asymmetry strengthens the stimulation of the pollution“border effect”by the regional environmental inspection system.This paper provides direct micro-empirical evidence of the“boundary effect”of centralized environmental regulation,and the relevant authorities should pay attention to the local government’s motivation and interest preferences in the formulation and implementation of centralized environmental regulation in the future,and overcome the agency costs of incentive incompatibility and uncertainty by reducing vertical information asymmetry.