卖空管制放松与高管薪酬契约——基于融资融券的准自然实验

Deregulation of Short Selling and Managerial Compensation Contract:A Quasi-Experiment from Chinese Margin Trading Program

本文以我国融资融券标的股票分步扩容作为准自然实验,检验了卖空管制放松对高管薪酬契约的影响。研究发现,卖空管制放松促使标的企业提升高管货币薪酬,股权激励授予强度却显著下降。并且,授予强度的下降由限制性股票主导,股票期权的授予强度却显著提升。在民营企业、技术密集型行业企业以及高管风险厌恶程度较大的企业中,上述关系更为显著。影响机制分析发现,负向盈余意外发生时,可卖空公司中的股价反应更加强烈,且卖空规模更大,表明我国资本市场中,以是否满足业绩阈值筛选卖空目标的卖空者的力量强盛。为弥补高管的职位风险并缓解其短期股价压力,企业进行了薪酬契约调整。经济后果分析发现,薪酬契约的调整缓解了卖空管制放松对企业风险承担水平的负面影响。研究结论证实,在我国的资本市场中,卖空管制放松符合"压力观"而非"约束观"。

Based on a quasi-experiment of the stock distribution expansion in China’s margin trading,this paper examines the effect of short selling on managerial compensation contract.The study finds the implementation of margin trading program affects the monetary pay level positively and equity incentive intensity negatively.The decline of intensity is dominated by the downward adjustment of restricted stocks intensity.The stock options intensity is significantly improved instead.Further evidences show that the effect of short selling is more pronounced in technology-intensive industries,private enterprises and enterprises with higher risk-adverse managers.Moreover,the sensitivity of stock price and short selling magnitude to negative earnings surprise are more pronounced in companies without short sale constraint,which means the underlying mechanism of the effect above is the prevailing force of short sellers who seek objects by whether satisfying the performance threshold.The companies adjust the managerial compensation contract to compensate extra job risk and to alleviate the short-term stock price concern.Correspondingly,managerial compensation adjustment alleviates the negative influences of short selling on enterprise risk taking level.The overall conclusion supports"pressure hypothesis"instead of"constraint hypothesis".