期刊文献+

“名人独董”、管理层权力与股价崩盘风险 被引量:9

“Celebrity Independent Director”,Management Power and Stock Price Crash Risk
原文传递
导出
摘要 本文以2013—2017年A股上市公司作为研究样本,利用手工收集的独立董事声誉数据,在考虑管理层权力对股价崩盘风险影响的基础上,检验"名人独董"对管理层权力与股价崩盘风险关系的影响。研究发现,管理层权力越大,公司未来发生股价崩盘的风险越高;董事会中的"名人独董"在一定程度上能够削弱管理层权力对股价崩盘风险的影响,但抑制作用不显著。进一步研究发现,在拥有"名人独董"的公司中,"名人独董"出席会议次数越多越可能降低管理层权力对股价崩盘风险的影响;女性"名人独董"的人数越多越可能抑制管理层权力对股价崩盘风险的影响。 From the perspective of corporate governance,this paper takes the 2013—2017 Ashare listed company as a research sample,and uses the manually collected independent directors’reputation data.This paper tests the impact of"celebrity independent director"on the relationship between management power and stock price crash risk.The study found that the greater the power of management,the higher the risk of the company’s stock price crash in the future.The"celebrity director"in the board of directors can inhibit the influence of the increase of management power on the risk of stock price crash risk to a certain extent,but the supervision effect is not significant.Further research found that the increase in the number of attendances of"celebrity-only directors"and the gender characteristics of female"celebrity-only directors"can weaken the effects of management power on stock price collapse risk.
作者 吴先聪 管巍 WU Xian-cong;GUAN Wei(Business School,Southwest University of Political Science&Law,Chongqing 401120,China;Postal Resarch Center of China Post Group,Beijing Engineering Research Center of Intelligent Equipment,Postal Scientific Research and Planning Academy,Beijing 100096,China)
出处 《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2020年第1期98-113,共16页 Modern Finance and Economics:Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
基金 教育部人文社会科学规划项目(19YJA630089) 重庆市哲学社会科学规划项目(2016YBGL119).
关键词 独立董事 声誉机制 管理层权力 股价崩盘风险 independent director reputation incentive management power stock price crash risk
  • 相关文献

参考文献24

二级参考文献540

共引文献3764

同被引文献208

引证文献9

二级引证文献24

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部