政府外部治理与银行风险承担——来自中国上市银行的经验证据

本文采用2009年至2020年我国36家上市银行的季度数据,研究了政府外部治理效应对商业银行风险承担水平的影响作用。研究发现,政府监管能够降低银行风险承担,主要来源于银行权益资本比率提升;政府持股一般会提升银行风险承担,主要来源于银行业绩波动性上升,但如果政府为银行的第一大股东,则会降低银行风险承担;政府公共治理改善对银行风险承担的影响具有正反两方面效应;政府对银行绝对控股可能会削弱监管和公共治理改善对银行风险承担的作用,主要由于银行权益资本比率变化。基于研究结论,本文提出了进一步发挥政府外部治理效能促进银行风险管控的政策建议。

This paper takes the quarterly data of 36 listed banks in China from 2009 to 2020 as an example to study the impact of external government governance effects on the risk-taking level of commercial banks.The empirical research finds that government supervision can reduce banks’risk-taking,mainly due to the increase in the bank's equity capital ratio;government shareholding generally increases banks’risk-taking,mainly due to the increase in the volatility of bank performance,but if the government is the largest shareholder of the bank,it will reduce the bank’s risk-taking;the impact of the government’s improvement of the public governance environment on banks'risk-taking has both positive and negative effects;the government’s absolute control of banks may weaken the role of supervision and public governance environment on banks'risk-taking,mainly due to changes in bank equity capital ratios.Based on the research conclusions,policy suggestions to further exert the external governance effectiveness of the government to prevent bank risks are put forward.