股权激励业绩条件与管理层机会主义行为——基于管理层业绩预告的分析

利用我国A股上市公司公布的股权激励草案与强制性业绩预告,本文分析了管理层针对股权激励业绩条件的机会主义行为。本文发现管理层在股权激励草案公布之前的窗口期内会做出更加悲观(乐观程度更低)的业绩预告,而且股权激励业绩条件的设计会对管理层的机会主义行为产生影响,当公司使用单一的业绩目标进行考核、侧重净利润考核或者未使用行业相对指标时,管理层做出的业绩预告更加悲观(乐观程度更低)。进一步地,本文发现无论是对于股票期权还是限制性股票,管理层均存在着机会主义行为,且这种行为增加了管理层最终成功行权和解锁的可能性。另外,隐形激励(在职消费)和有效的内外部治理机制,如相对独立的董事会、分析师的跟踪、外部审计以及监管机构的关注都对管理层的机会主义行为具有一定的抑制作用。

Using the equity incentives plans and mandatory performance forecasts announced by A-share listed companies,this paper analyzes management's opportunistic behavior in response to equity incentive performance conditions.The paper finds that management makes more pessimistic(less optimistic)performance forecasts in the window period before the announcement of the equity incentive plans,and the design of the equity incentive performance conditions affects management's opportunistic behavior.When the company uses a single performance target for evaluation,focuses on net profit evaluation,or does not use industry relative indicators,the performance forecast made by the management is more pessimistic(less optimistic).Further,the paper finds that management's opportunistic behavior is present for both stock options and restricted stock,and that this behavior increases the likelihood that management will eventually successfully exercise and unlock the options.In addition,perks and effective internal and external governance mechanisms,such as a relatively independent board of directors,analyst follow-up,external audits,and regulatory attention,have a dampening effect on management’s opportunistic behavior.