控股股东股权质押会导致上市公司过度负债吗?

Will Controlling Shareholders’ Share Pledges Lead to Excess Leverage of the Listed Company?

股权质押后控股股东的控制权与现金流权分离,容易产生掏空动机,进而影响公司过度负债水平。基于2007-2019年A股上市公司数据的实证检验表明,控股股东股权质押显著提高了公司过度负债水平,且这一促进作用在非国有性质、代理问题较严重或融资约束程度较低的公司中更加显著。进一步分析发现,控股股东股权质押比例与公司过度负债之间存在“倒U型”关系。本文为进一步优化公司资本结构、完善公司治理机制提供了有益的理论依据与政策启示。

After share pledges,the separation of control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders is likely to make them generate the motivation of tunneling,which may influence the level of excess leverage.The empirical tests based on the data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2019 show that controlling shareholders’share pledges significantly increase the level of excess leverage.Moreover,for companies with non-state-owned nature,more serious agency problems or lower financing constraints,the impact of controlling shareholders’share pledges on excess leverage is more significant.Further analysis shows that,there is an inverted U-shaped relation between the pledge ratio and excess leverage.This paper provides beneficial theoretical basis and policy suggestions for further optimizing the corporate capital structure and improving the corporate governance mechanism.