融资融券与公司股权激励计划——来自中国资本市场的经验证据

Short Selling,Margin Trading and Stock-based Compensation——Evidence from China Stock Market

2010年推出的融资融券制度标志着我国资本市场卖空限制的放开,其对公司内部治理机制产生的影响得到广泛关注。文章选取股权激励计划这一公司治理的重要方式,基于中国制度背景,研究融资融券是否以及如何影响上市公司选择股权激励计划的意愿。结果表明,放开卖空限制后,公司采用股权激励的动机显著下降,而有效性并无明显变化。进一步研究发现,融资融券对股权激励的影响途径包括公司治理质量与股价信息含量。

The margin trading and short selling program introduced in 2010 signals the liberation of short selling in China.Its effects on corporate governance mechanism have received wide attention.Based on the China’s unique institutional background,this paper uses logistic and panel data analysis method to examine whether and how the short-selling and margin-trading program influences stock-based compensation.The results show that the liberalization of short-selling restrictions significantly weakens firms’motivation to use equity incentive but has no effects on equity incentive effectiveness.Further study shows that margin trading and short selling program influences stock-based compensation through two ways of corporate governance and stock price informativeness.