“缓解”还是“加剧”:董秘的财务经历与企业融资约束——以新三板上市公司为样本的经验证据

“Easing” or “Intensification”?: Board Secretary’s Financial Experience and Financing Constraints--Based on the Empirical Study of NEEQ

本文以新三板挂牌公司为样本,通过实证研究证明董秘的财务经历有助于降低企业的融资约束水平。同时,通过更换融资约束的测度方式、扩大财务经历定义范围、剔除国有企业样本进行稳健性检验并且利用工具变量法、安慰剂检验与PSM-DID等方法控制内生性后,本文的实证结论依旧稳健。降低信息不对称成本是董秘的财务经历影响企业融资约束的机制。进一步研究表明,董秘的财务经历在传统行业中对融资约束的缓解作用更显著,而在高新行业中不显著。

This study takes the NEEQ listed firms as an empirical research sample.Additionally,the empirical conclusions remain robust after changing the measurement of financing constraints,expanding the scope of financial experience definition,removing state-owned enterprise samples for robustness testing,and controlling endogeneity using instrumental variables,placebo test,and PSM-DID.Low information asymmetry costs is the mechanism which affects corporate financing constraints.Further research shows that secretaries with financial experience have a more significant role in alleviating financing constraints in traditional industries,but not in high-tech industries.