摘要
本文从投资者有限理性和信息不对称视角探究了管理层讨论与分析(MD&A)语调操纵策略对资产定价效率的影响。研究发现,MD&A语调越积极,资产误定价程度越高,且这一关系在资产被高估时更加显著。拓展检验发现,管理层的MD&A语调策略影响资产定价效率的主要机理在于管理者利用积极的MD&A语调影响投资者情绪的同时进一步加大了企业和投资者的信息不对称程度。并且在管理层持股比例较高、盈余操纵空间较小以及外部审计质量较低的分组中MD&A语调积极程度对资产误定价的影响更加显著。
This paper explores the influence of MD&A tone manipulation strategy on asset pricing efficiency from the perspective of investors’bounded rationality and information asymmetry.The study found that the more positive the MD&A tone,the higher the degree of mispricing of assets,and this relationship was even more pronounced when assets were overvalued.According to the expansion test,the main mechanism that the MD&A tone strategy of the management affects the asset pricing efficiency is that the managers use the positive MD&A tone to influence the investor sentiment and further increase the degree of information asymmetry between enterprises and investors.In addition,MD&A tone has more significant influence on asset mispricing in the groups with high management shareholding,little room for earnings manipulation and low external audit quality.
出处
《投资研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第1期77-91,共15页
Review of Investment Studies
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(17BJY030)
兵团社会科学基金项目(17YB08).
关键词
管理层讨论与分析
语调操纵
资产误定价
MD&A
Tone Manipulation
Asset Mispricing
Management Self-interest