农村集体经营性建设用地入市利益相关者分析——一个三方博弈分析框架

Analysis of Stakeholders of Rural Collective Operation-Constructed Land Entering the Market——A Framework for Tripartite Game Analysis

农村集体经营性建设用地入市是推进农业供给侧结构性改革的关键一环,关乎数亿农民的财产性权益。但当前试点地区各方参与者对于推进农村集体经营性建设用地入市的积极性不够,土地要素的生产力未得到充分释放。本研究以博弈论为基础,构建由地方政府、村集体、企业参与的三方不完全信息动态博弈模型。通过建立收益矩阵及三方在决策时的总效用函数,分析得到三方的利益最大化策略。研究结果表明:三方的策略、行动和预期结果不能够连贯并合理,在相关参数不确定的情况下,难以确定总效用值最大化的稳定解;同时待入市农村集体经营性建设用地的估价是影响地方政府、村集体策略的关键性要素。在总体政策层面,要制定规范制度,明确权责;强化土地确权,减少交易风险;创建透明交易平台,协调各方利益,建立调节机制。在博弈参与方层面,地方政府应严控建设用地总量,根据农村集体经营性建设用地估价结果决定是否采取扶持政策;村集体应委托专业机构进行估价,根据农村集体经营性建设用地估价结果决定是否入市;投资企业需关注政策和市场,树立良好声誉,承担责任,保持透明运营,回应社会关切。

The market entry for rural collective-operated construction land is a pivotal component in advancing structural reforms on the supply side of agriculture,with implications for the property rights and interests of hundreds of millions of farmers.However,in current pilot areas,there is insufficient enthusiasm from all participants to involved in promotion of collective-operated construction land into the market,and the full potential of land remains untapped.With game theory as foundation,this study constructs a dynamic tripartite incomplete information game model involving local governments,village collectives,and enterprises.By establishing a profit matrix and the total utility function for these three parties in their decision-making processes,this research analyzes strategies aimed at maximizing the interests of all involved.The resuluts shows that the strategies,actions,and anticipated outcomes of the three parties are lack coherence,in the presence of uncertainty in the relevant parameters,it is difficult to identify a stable solution that maximizes the value of total utility;the value of rural collective-operated construction land awaiting entry into the market is a critical factor influencing the strategies of village collectives and local governments.At the level of overall policy,it is necessary to formulate a standardized system to clarify rights and responsibilities;strengthen land ownership to reduce transaction risks;create a transparent transaction platform,coordinate the interests of all parties and establish a regulation mechanism.At the level of game participants,local governments should strictly control the total amount of construction land and decide whether to adopt supportive policies based on the results of rural collective-operated construction land valuation;village collectives should entrust professional organizations to carry out valuation and decide whether to enter the market based on the results of rural collective-operated construction land valuation;investing enterprises should pay attention to the policy and the market,build up a good reputation,take responsibility,maintain transparent operations and respond to social concerns.