证监会随机抽查能提高上市公司会计信息质量吗

Can CSRC Random Inspection Improve the Accounting Information Quality of Listed Companies

基于证监会随机抽查"双随机、一公开"的准自然实验,对作为事前监管重要举措的随机抽查制度的监管效应进行了研究。研究发现,证监会随机抽查能够显著抑制应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理,其在改善会计信息质量方面效果显著。分组检验显示,证监会随机抽查对会计信息质量的监管效应在监管力度较强、机构投资者持股比例较高以及非国有公司中更为显著,即执法权威、社会监督及主体自律可以增强证监会随机抽查制度的监管效应。进一步的研究显示,证监会随机抽查既能对被抽查公司产生长期效应,还能对同一地区未被抽查公司产生溢出效应。

Based on the quasi-natural experiment of“Two Random and One Public”supervised by CSRC,this paper mainly studied the effectiveness of random inspection system working as an important measure of prior regulation.The study found that,CSRC random inspection had an evident improving effect on accounting information management.Group test showed that,the regulatory effect of random inspection was more significant in the firms with stronger regulation,higher ratio of institutional investor shareholdings and non-state-owned enterprises.This meant that,authoritative law enforcement,social regulation and subject self-discipline all had a enhancement effect on the supervision of random inspection.Further analysis showed that random inspection not only had a long-term effect on the selected firms,but also had a spillover effect on other companies in the same area.