专业委员会交叠任职对资产剥离的影响——基于战略委员会和审计委员会的研究视角

How Does the Overlapping Appointments of Professional Committees Have Affected Asset Divestiture——Based on the Perspectives of Strategy Committee and Audit Committee

以中国2013—2020年沪深A股上市公司为样本,从内部兼任网络视角出发,实证研究了战略委员会和审计委员会交叠任职对企业资产剥离决策及剥离效果的影响。研究发现:在资产剥离决策方面,战略委员会与审计委员会非独立董事交叠任职比例越高,企业选择资产剥离战略的可能性越大;在资产剥离效果方面,由于大股东机会动机或委员会成员履职冲突,企业通过资产剥离缓解经营压力、聚焦核心优势、提升经营绩效的积极战略效果在战略委员会和审计委员会交叠任职的情景下无法完全发挥。

Using the samples of China’s A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2013 to 2020,this paper empirically investigated the impact of the overlapping appointment of strategic committee and audit committee on the decision-making and effect of enterprise assets divestiture.The results showed that,higher proportion of non-independent directors’overlapping appointments was more likely for corporates to select the strategy of assets divestiture.Considering divestiture effect,corporates originally aimed to relieve operating pressure,focusing on core advantages and promoting operating performance.However,because of the opportunism of large shareholder or the performance conflict of committee members,assets divestiture may not fully exert its positive effect.