国家治理体系与中央企业投资效率——基于巡视监督的准自然实验研究

State Governance System and the Investment Efficiency of Central Stated-Owned Enterprises——A Quasi Natural Experiment Based on Inspection Supervision

利用2009—2015年间中央企业巡视事件,采用渐进性的双重差分模型,考察巡视监督对中央企业投资效率的影响。研究表明,巡视监督能够显著提升中央企业的投资效率,尤其能够抑制其投资过度现象。这一结果在被"回头看"的中央企业以及高管职业生涯关注度更高和权力更大的中央企业分组中更加显著。机制检验发现,巡视监督对企业投资效率的提升目前主要是通过发挥其震慑作用使得高管自利动机减弱来实现的。通过对投资活动进行分类考察还发现,投资效率的提升主要是通过缩减固定资产、在建工程等有形资本投资支出达成的。

This paper examined the impact of the inspection supervision executed by CCDI(Central Commission for Discipline Inspection)on the investment efficiency of central state-owned enterprises from 2009 to 2015 by using the multi-phase DID method.The study found that,there was a positive effect of the inspection supervision,which was especially conducive to inhibiting over-investment.This conclusion was more significant in the central enterprises having been inspected twice or more,as well as the enterprises with the senior executives of high attention or greater power.Mechanism test showed that,the main channel of this promoting effect was the deterrent effect of inspection supervision,which had relieaved executives’self-interested motives.Further classified investigation of investment activities found that,the improvement of investment efficiency mainly relied on the reduction of tangible capital investment expenditures,such as fixed assets and construction in progress.