国企并购绩效与高管变更——行业冲击还是权力防御

Merger and Acquisition Performance of State-owned Enterprise Affects Executive Turnover: Industry Shock or Power Defense

采用2007—2016年沪深两市发生并购活动的A股国有上市公司为研究样本,以并购后2年为高管变更观察期,探究了国企并购绩效与高管变更的相互关系及其影响因素。结果发现:国企并购绩效与高管变更负相关;行业并购绩效冲击会显著加剧二者之间的负相关关系;高管权力在国企负责人的绩效考评体系中发挥了较强的抑制作用。本文研究结论为混合所有制改革背景下的国有企业经理人绩效考评制度的完善与改革提供了一定的经验证据。

This paper used the A-share state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2007-2016 as research samples,and took the two years after M&A as the observation period of executive turnover,to test the relationship between the performance of state-owned enterprises’M&A and executive turnover and its influencing factors.The Empirical finds that:the performance of state-owned enterprises’M&A is negatively related to the executive turnover,and the impact of industry M&A performance significantly intensifies this relationship,and rigorously evaluates the management ability of executives’M&A integration,and executive power plays a significant role in restraining the performance evaluation system of state-owned enterprises’principals.The conclusion of the study provides empirical evidence for the improvement and reform of the performance appraisal system of stateowned enterprises under the background of mixed ownership reform.