摘要
好评奖励在网络购物过程中的广泛推行,致使在线评论严重偏离真实情形.这一不正当竞争行为不但降低了在线评论的参考价值,而且破坏了网络购物市场正常的经营秩序.基于社会交易理论,构建营销者、消费者与网络平台三方参与的演化博弈模型,在考虑网络平台实施奖惩机制的基础上,系统分析买卖双方关于好评奖励计划的博弈演化路径、稳定策略及参数变化对演化过程的影响.研究发现:在不同的约束条件下,(0,0)或(1,1)是系统动态演化的稳定策略;策略成本、额外收益和奖惩效用促进博弈双方朝向(0,0)均衡点进行演化.根据买卖双方的演化博弈特点,提出阻断好评奖励计划实行的三点建议:提高好评奖励的策略成本,降低好评奖励的额外收益,加大网络平台的奖惩效用.
The wide implementation of favorable comment reward in the process of shopping makes online reviews deviate from the authenticity seriously,which not only reduces the reference value of online reviews,but also destroys the normal order of shopping market.Based on the social transaction theory,this study constructs an evolutionary game model involving the participation of three parties,namely marketers,consumers and online platforms.On the basis of considering the implementation of reward and punishment mechanism of online platforms,this study systematically analyzes the evolution path,stability strategy and parameter change on the evolutionary process of favorable comment reward plan between buyers and sellers.It is found that(0,0)and(1,1)are stable strategies for system dynamic evolution under different constraints.Strategy cost,extra benefit and rewards and punishment effect promote the evolution of the two sides towards the equilibrium point(0,0).According to the characteristics of the evolutionary game between buyers and sellers,this study puts forward three suggestions for blocking the implementation of the favorable comment reward program:increasing the strategic cost of favorable comment reward,reducing the additional benefits of favorable comment reward,and increasing the rewards and punishment effectiveness of the network platform.
作者
宋之杰
唐晓莉
SONG Zhi-jie;TANG Xiao-li(School of Economics and Management,Yanshan University,Qinhuangdao 066004,China)
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
北大核心
2020年第3期95-104,共10页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
河北省教育厅高等学校科技计划重点项目(ZD2018208)
河北省研究生创新资助项目(CXZZBS2018061).
关键词
好评奖励
在线评论
评论偏差
演化博弈
favorable review reward
online reviews
evaluation deviation
evolutionary game