并购活动与标的公司共享审计师对并购溢价的影响研究

Impact of Shared Auditors of M&A Companies on M&A Premiums

本文以并购活动与标的公司共享审计师为场景,研究制度性约束条件下共享审计师对并购溢价的影响效果。研究发现,并购审计与标的公司共享审计师有助于抑制并购溢价;共享审计师声誉和行业专长能力越好,抑制并购溢价的效果越明显;共享审计师对标的公司越熟悉,抑制并购溢价的效果越弱。进一步研究发现,共享审计师通过降低资产误定价抑制并购溢价,发挥了降低资产误定价的功能。当标的公司年报可读性和分析师预测准确性较差时,共享审计师抑制并购溢价的效果更显著。此外,宏观经济形势越好,企业生命周期越长,共享审计师抑制并购溢价的效果也越明显。从经济后果来看,共享审计师抑制并购溢价还能有效防控股价崩盘风险。本研究有助于增强我们对并购活动共享审计师功能作用的认识,对促进并购资产合理定价具有重要启示意义。

Based on the scenario that M&A activities share auditors with target companies,we study the effect of shared auditors on M&A premium under institutional constraints.We find that the shared auditors between M&A activities and the target company help restrain the M&A premium.The higher the reputation and industrial expertise of shared auditors,the more obvious the effect of restraining M&A premium.The higher the familiarity between shared auditors and target companies,the weaker the effect of restraining M&A premium.The mechanism is that the shared auditor plays a role in reducing mispricing of asset.Further,when the readability of the target company’s annual report and the accuracy of the analyst’s forecast is poor,the effect of shared auditors restraining M&A premium is more evident.The inhibition effect of shared auditors on M&A premium conforms to macroeconomic situation and business life cycle.Shared auditors can effectively prevent the risk of stock price collapse by suppressing M&A premium.The research is helpful for the further improvement of the shared audit system for M&A activities.