审计师内部流动、客户追随与审计意见决策

Auditor’s Internal Flow, Client Following and Audit Opinion Decision

会计师事务所内部的审计师流动现象十分常见,但学界研究不多。本文从审计意见角度考察审计师内部流动的经济后果,研究发现,审计师在事务所内部流动之后会优待追随者客户,表现为更少出具非标审计意见且审计报告激进度更高;而且客户与审计师关系越密切,审计师对追随者客户的优待越明显;但严格的事务所质控机制可有效抑制审计师对追随者客户的优待动机。进一步研究发现,相比流向总所,审计师流向分所之后对追随者客户的审计意见优待更明显;审计师流向经济发达地区或者法治环境严格地区之后对追随者客户的优待动机有所收敛;审计专家比一般审计师更重视个人声誉,往往不会优待追随者客户。研究结论为事务所及监管部门加强审计师流动管理提供了科学依据。

It is quite common for auditors to flow internally within an accounting firm,but little literature studies on it.From the perspective of audit opinion decision,this paper looks into economic consequences of auditor’s internal flow,and finds that after auditor’s internal flow,auditor will give preferential treatment to follower client,which means less qualified audit opinions and more aggressive audit report.Further,the closer the relationship between the follower client and the auditor is,the stronger the auditor’s preference for the follower client will be.However,the stricter the accounting firm’s quality control mechanism is,the more effective it is to restrain the auditor’s motivation to treat follower client favorably.In the further analysis,compared with the auditor’s flow to the head office,in the case of flow to the branch office,the auditor’s preferential treatment on the audit opinion of the follower client is more obvious.When auditors flow to developed areas and strict legal environment,the auditor’s preferential motivation for follower clients is somewhat convergent.Audit experts pay more attention to the maintenance of personal reputation than general auditors,so they do not give obvious preferential treatment for follower clients.This paper provides a scientific basis for accounting firms and its regulatory authorities to strengthen the management of auditor’s flow.