基于三方博弈的被动式住宅市场主体行为研究

Research on the Subject Behavior of the Passive Housing Market Based on the Tripartite Game

推进被动式住宅规模化发展是实现建筑业可持续发展、全面落实绿色发展观的重要举措。基于演化博弈理论,构建政府-开发商-购房者三方博弈模型,分析政府"激励"+"惩罚"策略主导下主体行为演化过程及稳定策略,探讨政府被动监管的边界问题,并对演化结果进行仿真分析。研究结果显示:在推进被动式住宅发展过程中,政府被动监管边界与社会效益以及不合作违约金有直接关系,但在发展成熟期,政府在充分考虑投入-产出比后将不再干预,更倾向于由市场发挥调节作用;开发商与购房者行为偏好更大程度上取决于自身获利的大小。政府应从加强节能认证、调整补贴额度、完善惩罚机制、构建信用体系、提高居住质量5个方面来推进被动式住宅规模化发展。

The scale development of passive housing is an important measure to realize the sustainable development of construction industry and to implement the concept of green development in an all-round way.By establishing a tripartite evolutionary game model in consideration of government′s"incentive"+"punishment"double intervention and information asymmetry,the relationship among government,developers and consumers is analyzed,the boundary of administrative control is also discussed.A study is given to emulate the interrelationships among action,evolutionary path,evolutionary stable strategy and boundary of government passive supervision in the end.The results show that,the government′s passive supervision boundary has a direct relationship with social benefits and incremental tax revenue,but the government isn′t more inclined to interfere after fully considering the input-output ratio,and the development will tend to rely on market regulation in the mature period of development.A greater extent they gain determines the behavioral preferences of developers and customers.The government should strengthen energy conservation labeling,adjust the subsidy amount,perfect the punishment mechanism,construct credit system and improve living quality to promote the large-scale development of passive housing.