个性化算法定价中的垄断及其法律规制

Monopoly and Its Legal Regulation in Personalized Pricing Algorithms

个性化算法定价带来的价格歧视和默示合谋这两个垄断行为是未来数字经济领域中垄断风险的冰山一角。价格歧视可以将消费者剩余转向生产者剩余,默示合谋也可以通过其隐蔽性高效达成垄断协议,整个垄断利润的获得时常不为消费者和反垄断执法部门所感知。不论是价格歧视,还是默示合谋,都已超出了市场规范规制的能力之外。由价格歧视和默示合谋引发的个性化算法定价法律规制问题近年来在学界已有较多讨论,但对于个性化算法定价中的垄断行为及其危害的分析仍有进一步讨论的余地。法律规制建立在熟稔个性化算法定价的动态逻辑之上,对垄断行为进行法律规制的逻辑应在方法内容上作进一步阐释,对垄断危害的有效治理需要反垄断法的积极参与。

The two monopolistic behaviors of price discrimination and tacit collusion brought about by personalized algorithm pricing are the tip of the iceberg of monopoly risks in the future digital economy.Price discrimination can turn consumer surplus into producer surplus,and implied collusion can also reach a monopoly agreement through its concealment and efficiency.The acquisition of the entire monopoly profit is often not perceived by consumers and anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies.Whether it is price discrimination or tacit collusion,it is beyond the ability of the market to regulate itself.In fact,the legal regulation of persona-lized algorithmic pricing caused by price discrimination and tacit collusion has been discussed in academia in recent years,but there is still room for further discussion on the analysis of monopolistic behavior and its harm in personalized algorithmic pricing.Legal regulation is based on the dynamic logic of familiar personalized algorithmic pricing.The logic of legal regulation of monopoly behavior should be further explained in the method content.Effective governance of monopoly harm requires the active participation of anti-monopoly law.