“盲目推理”视角下的演绎证成问题

The Justification Problem from the Perspective of Blind Reasoning

自哈克明确提出演绎证成困境以来,“如何为演绎提供证成”已成为逻辑哲学探讨的核心之一。该问题的根本在于:如何在前提可信情况下确保演绎的结论也是可信的。考虑到外在主义和内在主义方案都面临诸多质疑以至失败,博格西安基于推理主义观点,提出一种所谓的“盲目推理”方案:假若主体掌握的某一概念的构成性条件是他能进行包含此概念的某一方式的推理,就此种方式的推理而言,他便有权利把对前提的相信传递至对结论的相信,如此从前提推出结论,无需证成也无可指责。当代学者威廉姆森、霍维奇、卡萨莱尼奥等人对此方案提出质疑,但是借助于班固提出的“习惯生成规则”这一思路,或可从语言共同体的约定实践层面对“盲目推理”方案作补充论证。

Since Susan Huck put forward the dilemma of Justification of deduction,“how to provide Justification for deduction”has become one of the cores of logical philosophy.The root of this problem is that how to ensure that the deduction conclusion is also credible when the premise is credible.Considering that both externalism and internalism have faced many doubts and even failed,Paul Boghossian proposed a so-called“blind reasoning”scheme based on the inferential view:If the condition of the constitution of any notion in the subject's grasp is that he can reason in a certain mode of reasoning involving the notion,then from this he has the right to transfer his belief in the premises to his belief in the conclusion,from which the conclusion can be deduced without proof and without reproach.Contemporary scholars Williamson,Horwich,Casalegno and others have questioned this scheme,but with the help of Bangu's idea of“habit-generating rules”,the“blind reasoning”scheme can be supplemented from the perspective of linguistic community convention practice.