朱熹知行观重审:“真知必能行”的知识论意涵及其论证

Review of Zhu Xi’s Idea of Knowing and Practicing:The Epistemological Implication and Argumentation of“True Knowing will Definitely Lead to Practicing”

重审朱熹知行观,将之概括为“两层四点”,并于工夫论结构中予以圆融的解释。朱熹驳斥知而不行而主张真知必能行。其策略有二:否认此“知”是真知;细分“不行”,并逐一予以批驳。“必能行”是真知规定意义中的应有之义。“知而不行”可转述为另一个知-行序列的“知而行”。将“能行”界定为一个具有现实性的、体现智力的倾向性概念,强调心是道德动力之源与真知贯穿诚意,阐明真知能够克服“知而不行”。真知必能行的证立,反过来确立了道德真知结构的一个维度。

Review Zhu Xi’s idea of knowing and practicing,summarize it as“two levels and four points”with a harmonious explanation in the structure of Gongfutheory.Zhu Xi refuted“knowing without practicing”and advocated“true knowing will definitely lead to practicing”by two strategies:denying that the knowledge without practicing is“true knowledge”;subdividing the situations of“no practicing”and refuting them individually.Through the analysis of concept,point out that“must be able to practice”is the inherent meaning of“true knowledge”.Refute“knowing without practicing”as a whole by claiming that“knowing without practicing”can be paraphrased as the“knowing with practicing”in another sequence of knowing-practicing.Define“Being able to practice”as a concept of realistic and intelligent disposition,emphasize that“Xin”with true knowing is the source of moral motivation and the true knowing permeates“Xin”,then true knowing can overcome“knowing without practicing”.The success of justification above,in turn,confirms a dimension of the structure of true moral knowledge.